In TLS mode proxy the server accepted X-Forwarded-For/Proto/Host from any
peer, so a client reaching the HTTP port directly could pick a new address
per sign-in (defeating the 5/min/IP limit), forge audit addresses and claim
HTTPS; the admin never warned (SRS-03, SRV-3). Forwarded headers now count
only from TITANO_TRUSTED_PROXIES (addresses or CIDR networks; default
loopback, 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, fc00::/7), and the Dashboard and
Settings show a "Not via proxy" chip with a tooltip when a page did not
come through a trusted proxy over HTTPS (ProxyWarning in DashboardDto and
ServerSettingsDto).
TITANO_PUBLIC_HTTP_PORT and TITANO_PUBLIC_HTTPS_PORT name the ports clients
reach when a container's ports are published as other host ports: the
admin's HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect and the LAN beacon use them instead of the
bound container ports (DOCKER-4, DOCKER-5). --help lists TITANO_LOG_LEVEL,
the new variables and the container's PUID, PGID and TZ (DOCKER-7); a test
keeps it in step with the variables the server reads.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012iLMBNwBE2GnphAsu4cjaC
Covers bootstrap admin, sign-in failure, lockout and rate limit, token
revocation and expiry, 401 versus 403, CSRF on cookie sessions, the error
shape and API header, chunked upload happy path, resume, hash
short-circuit, damaged chunk, quota, Range on originals, thumbnails and
exports, path traversal, settings_version conflicts, job state
transitions with a fake handler, render node claim, heartbeat timeout and
reassignment, output upload, WebSocket progress events, the discovery
beacon, the Windows service command line and status rules, and a
PostgreSQL run (TITANO_TEST_PG).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012iLMBNwBE2GnphAsu4cjaC