fix(server): refuse planted Windows data, guard new archives, trust only loopback proxies
- Windows data folder: the folder and everything in it must belong to SYSTEM, Administrators or the server's account and hold no link, checked before the ACL is rewritten; otherwise the server stops and names the entry. server.json is read only after its owner is checked on the open handle. Secrets are deleted and created anew with the private ACL, so a planted file's owner loses its rights. - Windows archive: a folder the server creates is changeable only by those accounts (users may read it) and a .titano folder it creates is private; an existing archive others can change is logged as a warning at start. - Proxy mode: only loopback is trusted by default, since LAN clients reach the HTTP port from private addresses; a cookie sign-in that did not come through a trusted proxy over HTTPS answers proxy_untrusted, naming TITANO_TRUSTED_PROXIES. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012iLMBNwBE2GnphAsu4cjaC
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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ public sealed record ServerCommandLine(ServerCommand Command, IReadOnlyList<stri
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ports clients reach when the container's ports are published as other host ports
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(admin redirect to HTTPS, LAN beacon)
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TITANO_TRUSTED_PROXIES proxy mode: addresses or networks (CIDR) whose X-Forwarded-* headers count
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(default: loopback, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, fc00::/7)
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(default: loopback only; list a proxy in another container or on another machine)
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Container image only: PUID, PGID (user and group the server runs as, owners of /data), TZ (local time zone)
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""";
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